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o p t i n g f o r s t a t e l e s s n e s s *
T h e A r t o f N o t B e i n g G o v e r n e d is vintage James
Scott: sweeping in scope, provocative in argument and lucid in style. It
is an ambitious work that spans a longue dur!ee of two millennia of
south-east Asian history. More precisely, it focuses on Zomia (a
Tibeto-Burman neologism meaning ‘‘region of remote people’’), the
highland massif that stretches from north-east India, through Bangla-
desh, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand to the central highlands of
Vietnam. Its main thesis is that over the centuries these highlands have
been a vast ‘‘region of refuge’’ inhabited by communities, which have
chosen not only to flee the instability and violence of lowland states but
also to deliberately opt for statelessness. This study of the making not
of states but of statelessness counters the conventional teleological
account of the formation of nation-states through the gradual in-
corporation of isolated, backward populations on their peripheries.
Instead it highlights the ‘‘state-repellent’’ strategies of upland mar-
ginal groups, which developed ingenious, semi-autonomous, alterna-
tive stateless systems. Like Eric Wolf’s monumental Europe and People
without History (1982), with its focus on those on periphery of the
world system, Scott’s study aims to draw into regional history and give
agency to those on the margins of the nation-state. But while Wolf
highlighted the patterns of global interconnections between those at
the periphery and the centres, Scott chooses to focus instead on the
disconnection of subaltern communities, who chose to opt out of state
control.
This path-breaking book offers a powerful counter-narrative to that
of the development of (modern) states as part of civilisational progress.
It argues that characteristic features of stateless hill societies, which
have often been examined in isolation from one another, can be read as
‘‘state effects’’ if taken together. Geographic dispersion, political
decentralisation, shifting cultivation, economic self-sufficiency, seg-
mentary kinship organisation and fuzzy ethnic boundaries can be
understood as deliberate and defensive responses to evade extraction
and avoid oppression by valley kingdoms. This bold thesis is an
* About James Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist
History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven/London, Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2009).
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important corrective to the unilineal view of isolated, backward hill
communities that are yet to be brought within the fold of the nation-
state. It shows instead that these societies, which have been in
continuous contact with state projects, are integral to the history of
state-formation in the region. The hill communities’ plural histories,
their lineage structures and mode of swidden cultivation, their re-
ligious heterodoxy and non-hierarchical political organisation, are all
thus interpreted as reactions to state formation in the valleys. For Scott
these are political choices designed to keep at bay the threat of being
governed. Hunting, foraging, slash-and-burn cultivation in the hills
were not primitive techniques in the absence of knowledge of wet rice
cultivation but were deliberate choices that required low labour input
and allowed little surplus accumulation, which was also difficult to
appropriate.
The thesis is based on a wealth of secondary historical sources and
ethnographic material including the works of Leach, Lehman, Latti-
more but also Clastres. Most of the historical documentation relied on
for the region, however, is confined to the period between 1850 and
1950. Yet Scott seems to claim near universal applicability for the
model derived from the history of South-East Asian hill communities
to all fringe regions of ‘‘internal colonialism’’. For the Zomia model is
generalised to ancient Rome, Roma in Europe, Berbers in the Atlas
Mountains, Cossacks in the Russian steppes, or Maroon communities
and fugitive slaves the world over, whose examples are marshalled to
make a case for the anarchist politics of all unruly frontiers.
More specifically, for South-East Asia the book demonstrates how the
very landscape of Zomia precluded the amassment of wealth by limiting
both the available surplus of grain and manpower. But the difficult
terrain also ‘‘prevented civilisations from climbing hills’’, as Scott pithily
puts it, in pursuit of labour and taxes. One of the book’s compelling
claims is about the ‘‘friction of terrain’’, which protected against state
domination and aided autonomy. The idea compels us to revise our
cartographic representations and rethink the significance of lines on
political maps, which render invisible the difficulties for army and
administration to access rugged mountainous areas. Population dynamics
and ecological factors are thus convincingly shown to be pivotal for an
understanding of social change in an area characterised by an abundance
of land and a shortage of labour. Yet the argument of the book is not free
from traces of both demographic and geographical determinism. For it
turns migration to the uplands, one factor in the historical dynamics of
the region, into its chief defining feature in the past 2000 years.
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Whereas Scott’s earlier studies of peasant resistance focussed on
voice, or the everyday practices of subversion of authority in the
absence of conditions that would allow for open opposition, this book
is about exit. Like several of his now classic works – The Moral
Economy of the Peasant: Subsistence and Rebellion in Southeast Asia
(1976), Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance
(1985), Domination and the Arts of Resistance: The Hidden Transcript
of Subordinate Groups (1990) –, which are variations on the theme of
resistance to power, the present volume too explores the agency of
subaltern groups in unexpected places and practices. But it shifts the
earlier focus on sedentary peasants challenging dominance within
agrarian systems to mobile hill people, who have chosen to fully turn
their backs on coercive state-making projects. These hill communities
thus embody a more fundamental mode of opposition to the systems of
slave-raiding, taxation, deportation, conscription and forced labour by
moving out of imperial cores altogether. The present volume also sets
a counter point to his Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1998). If exercise of
centralising state power is predicated on the use of techniques to
render the social and economic life of subjects ‘‘legible’’, for Scott,
shifting cultivation among hill peoples, like their fluid and flexible
ethnic identifications, and even the absence of writing, are all choices
designed to make their lives ‘‘illegible’’ to valley kingdoms and colonial
state administration.
Attractive as the stringency and stunning simplicity of this expla-
nation for a variety of characteristics of hill societies across the region
and the ages may be, its mono-causality is problematic on several
counts. For one, it reinforces the neat binaries of settled agriculture vs.
slash-and-burn cultivation, valley kingdoms vs. hill peoples, state vs.
anti-/non-state societies, while merely reversing their valorisation.
Zones and communities that have straddled or interconnected the
two are not taken into account. For another, it greatly overemphasises
the significance of the state in determining every aspect of the social,
economic, cultural and political lives of those in stateless societies, who
were outside its ambit. Consequently the reach, influence and effec-
tiveness of the state in south and South-East Asia are greatly over-
estimated. Unlike modern European states, pre-colonial states in most
of the non-Western world had neither the capacity nor the political will
to entirely colonise the life-worlds of their subjects. In fact, even in the
plains of the region, the state was probably rather marginal to the lives
of most people for much of their pre-modern histories.
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However, Scott’s model paradoxically also underestimates the sig-
nificance of the internal dynamics of hill communities. Interpreted
solely through the optic of opposition to the valley state, all features of
hill communities are reduced to functional dependence on the imperial
valley state, which alone retains autonomous agency. It would be almost
impossible to provide a counterfactual explanation about the amount of
weight that should be assigned to the state in the making of hill societies.
Yet rich ethnographic accounts of highland Papua New Guinea, for
instance, allow a thought experiment that mounts a serious challenge to
Scott’s central thesis. Papua New Guinea’s highland groups exhibit the
very same features that mark South-East Asian uplands: an extraordi-
nary linguistic and cultural diversity, the absence of writing, a shifting
cultivation, cephalous political systems and constant low-intensity
warfare. Yet the valley state, with reference to whose predatory politics
Scott explains all these features in South-East Asia, was conspicuous by
its absence. Moreover, a Manichean picture contrasting the violence of
the predatory, centralising valley state with the egalitarian equilibrium of
small, self-governing hill republics is misleading for both regions. For
the celebration of statelessness not only neglects the existence of
complex systems of ranking and honour but also obscures the record
of constant feuding within villages and lineages as well as of endemic
warfare, violence and even sometimes headhunting between hill com-
munities in both South-East Asia and in Papua New Guinea.
By casting the state as the quintessential Other of hill societies,
Scott’s thesis neither takes account of the variety of classical, early
modern, imperial and colonial states nor of the chequered history of
state-making in societies as different as China, Thailand, Laos, Burma,
Vietnam or north-east India. But it also overlooks the varied meanings
and significance of state institutions and practices for local populations
in different contexts. The model cannot explain the present day
demands for self-determined statehood among hill peoples and the
desire for a just state, which would deliver the fruits of economic
development. Hill peoples today are protesting nationally and in-
ternationally in many regions of the world against their unequal and
unjust treatment within the nation-state. Even if this were a relatively
recent trend beyond the scope of the book’s historical thesis, little in its
account would explain the seemingly radical changes in the hills, where
intense aversion and avoidance of the state seems to have been recently
replaced by a strong desire and vociferous demand for a functioning
state. And this despite the often deep distrust among hill populations
of the designs and practices of real existing states.
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While valleys homogenized and centralised, Scott argues, the hills
produced egalitarianism, decentralisation, economic minimalism and
diversity. He is at pains to stress the continuous, creative adaptability of
upland small-scale, subsistence societies. In an attempt to restore
historical agency to them, all migration to the uplands is interpreted as
a deliberate choice in the defence of freedom from state control. But
such a reading tends to obscure the histories of forced displacement,
the durability of duress, expropriation and dispossession that deprived
communities of their lands and of access to the commons, thus driving
them into the hills. Whether and to what extent the push towards more
difficult and unproductive terrain at higher elevations was the result of,
or in reaction to, official state policies and practices, or was due to
conflicts with, and pressure from, powerful groups in the plains is
a moot question. Given its singular preoccupation with the state as the
nemesis of hill societies, Scott’s model fails to distinguish between
these two possibilities, one of which has little to do with state projects.
The radical constructionist perspective adopted in the book yields
some unexpected and valuable insights into the fluidity and mallea-
bility of ethnic labels and identifications in the region. In the place of
stable, unchanging, bounded hill ‘‘tribes’’, it presents a nuanced
picture of footloose families on the move, able to change languages,
ethnicity, histories and genealogies according to the circumstances.
These populations in a flux were constantly losing members in slave
raids or epidemics but also gaining them by way of runaways in-
corporated through kinship and marriage mechanisms. For Scott these
‘‘jelly-fish’’ societies were constituted by the logic, ‘‘divide that ye be
not ruled’’. But multiple, porous and contextually shifting identities
may have been a concomitant of social fragmentation in the hills. Or
fuzzy, overlapping identifications may be due to the absence of modern
colonial administrative technologies of enumeration, as Sudipto Kaviraj
has compelling shown for the plurality of pre-modern caste and
religious identities in the plains of India, where the pre-colonial state
neither policed the boundaries of social units nor intervened in
everyday social life.
The least plausible argument in the book concerns the deliberate
eschewing of literacy by hill tribes in order to escape state control.
Myths about the loss of script or literacy due to accident or deceit,
which abound among many a subaltern group in the hills but also in
the plains, can hardly be read as reflecting historical processes. The
claim that many of these communities are not pre-literate but had
a script, which they have abandoned in order to be able to oscillate
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between orality and writing depending on the circumstances, remains
unsubstantiated. Neither are we given evidence of the loss of literacy as
a matter of deliberate choice or as a result of historical processes, which
eroded the institutional basis for the reproduction of writing skills.
Scott’s functionalist argument emphasises the advantages of the
absence of a written historical record in aiding selective remembering,
providing greater flexibility to remake collective identities and to forge
changing political alliances. It does not consider that absence of
literacy may be equally linked with, for instance, the lack of commer-
cial, urban or wealthy, powerful religious centres of learning and of
a priestly caste/class. Not only does Scott’s account reduce writing to
its political functions alone, but it also fails to consider the world of
difference between the recognition of the advantages of oral tradition
and the giving up of script as a conscious collective choice.
The often overdrawn argument of the book may not entirely
convince the sceptic. But this panoramic and iconoclastic study sets
a new paradigm for the analysis of hill-valley interactions and of state-
making in South-East Asia and elsewhere. Even scholars who disagree
with many aspects of Scott’s thesis will have to debate these issues in
terms set by this bold and brilliant book on ‘‘barbarians by choice’’.
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